Hardback : HK$740.00
When we affirm (or deny) that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior (or inferior) about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its central focus. John Greco argues that knowledge is a kind of achievement, as opposed to mere lucky success. This locates knowledge within a broader, familiar normative domain. By reflecting on our thinking and practices in this domain, it is argued, we gain insight into what knowledge is and what kind of value it has for us.
When we affirm (or deny) that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior (or inferior) about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its central focus. John Greco argues that knowledge is a kind of achievement, as opposed to mere lucky success. This locates knowledge within a broader, familiar normative domain. By reflecting on our thinking and practices in this domain, it is argued, we gain insight into what knowledge is and what kind of value it has for us.
Preface; Part I. Epistemic Normativity: 1. Knowledge as success from ability; 2. Against deontology; 3. Against internalism; 4. Against evidentialism; Part II. Problems for Everyone: 5. The nature of knowledge; 6. The value of knowledge; 7. Knowledge and context; 8. The Pyrrhonian problematic; Part III. Problems for Reliabilism: 9. The problem of strange and fleeting processes; 10. The problem of defeating evidence; 11. The problem of easy knowledge; Bibliography; Index.
Argues that knowledge is a kind of achievement, exploring questions of what it is and what kind of value it has.
John Greco is the Leonard and Elizabeth Eslick Chair in Philosophy at Saint Louis University. His previous publications include Putting Skeptics in their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and their Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge, 2000). He is also the editor of The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism (2008), Sosa and his Critics (2004) as well as co-editor of Rationality and the Good (2007) and The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (1999).
"Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic
Normativity is an admirable piece of work, a well-argued and
insightful book. It is a strength of the book that Greco has read
widely on the topic and attempts to synthesize much of what has
been written."
--George Lăzăroiu, PhD /IISHSS, New York, Review of Contemporary
Philosophy
"...It is an honor to review this book.... the book is an excellent
example of the pursuit of an important research project.... the way
the book is laid out (as well as the updatings of the papers the
other chapters are based on) make the book a great read..."
--Trent Dougherty, Baylor University, American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly
"...Achieving Knowledge is a very competent addition to the
literature, clearly meriting the attention of the growing number of
epistemologists concerned with questions of value, virtue and
justification... Achieving Knowledge is fundamentally an attempt to
integrate competing intuitions concerning epistemic normativity
into a single unifying theory..."
--Michael-John Turp, University of Durham, UK, Philosophy in Review
|
Ask a Question About this Product More... |
|
