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Calculating Credibility examines-and ultimately rejects-a fundamental belief held by laypeople and the makers of American foreign policy: the notion that backing down during a crisis reduces a country's future credibility. Fear of diminished credibility motivated America's costly participation in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and, since the end of the Cold War, this concern has continued to guide American policy decisions. Daryl G. Press uses historical evidence, including declassified documents, to answer two crucial questions: When a country backs down in a crisis, does its credibility suffer? How do leaders assess their adversaries' credibility? Press illuminates the decision-making processes behind events such as the crises in Europe that preceded World War II, the superpower showdowns over Berlin in the 1950s and 60s, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. When leaders face the prospect of high-stakes military conflicts, Press shows, they do not assess their adversaries' credibility by peering into their opponents' past and evaluating their history of keeping or breaking commitments. Power and interests in the current crisis-not past actions-determine the credibility of a threat.
Press demonstrates that threats are credible only if backed by sufficient power and only if pursuing important interests. Press believes that Washington's obsession with the dangers of backing down has made U.S. foreign policy unnecessarily rigid. In every competitive environment-sports, gambling, warfare-competitors use feints and bluffs to tremendous advantage. Understanding the real sources of credibility, Press asserts, would permit a more flexible, and more effective, foreign policy.
Calculating Credibility examines-and ultimately rejects-a fundamental belief held by laypeople and the makers of American foreign policy: the notion that backing down during a crisis reduces a country's future credibility. Fear of diminished credibility motivated America's costly participation in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and, since the end of the Cold War, this concern has continued to guide American policy decisions. Daryl G. Press uses historical evidence, including declassified documents, to answer two crucial questions: When a country backs down in a crisis, does its credibility suffer? How do leaders assess their adversaries' credibility? Press illuminates the decision-making processes behind events such as the crises in Europe that preceded World War II, the superpower showdowns over Berlin in the 1950s and 60s, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. When leaders face the prospect of high-stakes military conflicts, Press shows, they do not assess their adversaries' credibility by peering into their opponents' past and evaluating their history of keeping or breaking commitments. Power and interests in the current crisis-not past actions-determine the credibility of a threat.
Press demonstrates that threats are credible only if backed by sufficient power and only if pursuing important interests. Press believes that Washington's obsession with the dangers of backing down has made U.S. foreign policy unnecessarily rigid. In every competitive environment-sports, gambling, warfare-competitors use feints and bluffs to tremendous advantage. Understanding the real sources of credibility, Press asserts, would permit a more flexible, and more effective, foreign policy.
Daryl G. Press is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.
"This interesting book challenges one of the most widely accepted principles of international relations, the definition of what constitutes 'threat credibility.' ... Press's well-written, well-researched, and controversial book will likely provide the grist for many discussions in graduate seminars in international politics and national security."-Choice, September 2006 "Scholars have long been trying to drive a stake through the heart of one of the last century's most enduring legacies-Munich. The latest to grip the hammer is Daryl Press, and his well-argued (and commendably concise) book should be required reading for historians and policy wonks alike. Calculating Credibility compares two principal theories of crisis decisionmaking: 'past actions' (i.e., Munich), and 'current calculus.'"-Ralph Hitchens, The Journal of Military History "In Calculating Credibility, Daryl Press takes on a major issue in the field of security studies: the role of reputation in decision makers' assessments of military threats... By casting serious doubt on the claim that decision makers rely heavily on their adversaries' past behavior when judging credibility, Press has made a real contribution to our understanding of threat perception."-Barbara Farnham, International Studies Review 2006 "Daryl G. Press has written a truly important book. He demolishes the widely held belief that a state that backs down in a crisis loses credibility in the next crisis. In fact, he shows that a state's past behavior has almost no effect on how other states assess its credibility. Reputation is an overblown concept. The American foreign-policy elite should be told immediately about Press's findings."-John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago "Calculating Credibility considers how policymakers estimate whether another state's threats are credible. Although some have charged that deterrence is irrelevant in the post-Cold War era, how states make credible threats is of considerable practical importance. For instance, the Bush administration argued that the United States was justified in going to war against Iraq to preserve the credibility of the United Nations. This book fills a major gap in the literature in security studies and deterrence theory."-Deborah Welch Larson, UCLA
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