The emotions we experience are crucial to who we are, to what we think, and to what we do. But what are emotions, exactly, and how do they relate to agency? The aim of this book is to spell out an account of emotions, which is grounded on analogies between emotions and sensory experiences, and to explore the implications of this account for our understanding of human agency. The central claim is that emotions consist in perceptual experiences of values, such as the
fearsome, the disgusting or the admirable. A virtue of this account is that it affords a better grasp of a variety of interconnected phenomena, such as motivation, values, responsibility and
reason-responsiveness. In the process of exploring the implications of the Perceptual Theory of emotions, several claims are proposed. First, emotions normally involve desires that set goals, but they can be contemplative in that they can occur without any motivation. Second, evaluative judgements can be understood in terms of appropriate emotions in so far as appropriateness is taken to consist in correct representation. Third, by contrast with what Strawsonian theories hold, the concept of
moral responsibility is not response-dependent, but the relationship between emotions and moral responsibility is mediated by values. Finally, in so far as emotions are perceptions of values, they can be
considered to be perceptions of practical reasons, so that on certain conditions, acting on the basis of one's emotions can consist in responding to one's reasons.
The emotions we experience are crucial to who we are, to what we think, and to what we do. But what are emotions, exactly, and how do they relate to agency? The aim of this book is to spell out an account of emotions, which is grounded on analogies between emotions and sensory experiences, and to explore the implications of this account for our understanding of human agency. The central claim is that emotions consist in perceptual experiences of values, such as the
fearsome, the disgusting or the admirable. A virtue of this account is that it affords a better grasp of a variety of interconnected phenomena, such as motivation, values, responsibility and
reason-responsiveness. In the process of exploring the implications of the Perceptual Theory of emotions, several claims are proposed. First, emotions normally involve desires that set goals, but they can be contemplative in that they can occur without any motivation. Second, evaluative judgements can be understood in terms of appropriate emotions in so far as appropriateness is taken to consist in correct representation. Third, by contrast with what Strawsonian theories hold, the concept of
moral responsibility is not response-dependent, but the relationship between emotions and moral responsibility is mediated by values. Finally, in so far as emotions are perceptions of values, they can be
considered to be perceptions of practical reasons, so that on certain conditions, acting on the basis of one's emotions can consist in responding to one's reasons.
1: Emotion and Perception
2: Emotion and Motivation
3: Emotion and Values
4: Emotion and Responsibility
5: Emotion and Agency
Christine Tappolet is Full Professor at the Département de
philosophie at the Université de Montréal. Her research interests
lie mainly in ethics, moral psychology, and emotion theory. She has
edited a number of volumes, including, with Sarah Stroud, Weakness
of Will and Practical Rationality (Oxford, 2003), and is the author
of a number of articles and chapters on themes such as values,
normativity, weakness of will, procrastination,
autonomy and emotions, as well as of two books, Émotions et valeurs
(2000, Presses Universitaires de France), and with Ruwen Ogien, Les
concepts de l'éthique. Faut-il être conséquentialiste? (Hermann,
2008).
Tappolet's book is to be recommended, first of all, for the way in
which it shows how her theory of emotion interlocks with plausible
theories of value and agency, and how these interlocking theories
mutually support each other. The project is ambitious, as it
requires a grasp of the difficulties in different and vast fields
of inquiry, but the book lives up to its ambition: it is rich,
accessibly written, well-structured, and extremely well-informed.
It is focused, in the sense that in many cases it provides just the
right amount of information about the theories discussed... I
recommend this book to anyone interested in emotions, motivation,
values, moral responsibility, and agency. Tappolet has illuminating
things to say about all of these matters and, in particular, about
the ways in which they interconnect. Her ambitious project has
succeeded.
*Benjamin De Mesel, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*
This excellent, concise, and engaging volume is highly recommended
for anyone in the philosophy of emotion or interested in the
relation between emotions and perception, ethics, or agency.
*Justin D'Arms, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.*
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