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The historical record of scientific inquiry, Stanford suggests, is characterized by what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. Stanford supports this claim
with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. He goes on to argue that
this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives
itself.Stanford concludes by investigating what positive account of the spectacularly successful edifice of modern theoretical science remains open to us if we accept that our best scientific theories are
powerful conceptual tools for accomplishing our practical goals, but abandon the view that the descriptions of the world around us that they offer are therefore even probably or approximately true."Stanford has genuinely advanced the philosophical discussion about scientific realism with his careful articulation of the problem of unconceived alternatives."-- The Review of Metaphysics "Stanford's book deserves to be widely read. Its
central argument is clearly stated, its conclusion is radical, it engages in a productive fashion with detailed case studies, and it lays down several substantial challenges to scientific realism. Lastly, it is
consistently thought-provoking."-Science
The historical record of scientific inquiry, Stanford suggests, is characterized by what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. Stanford supports this claim
with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. He goes on to argue that
this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives
itself.Stanford concludes by investigating what positive account of the spectacularly successful edifice of modern theoretical science remains open to us if we accept that our best scientific theories are
powerful conceptual tools for accomplishing our practical goals, but abandon the view that the descriptions of the world around us that they offer are therefore even probably or approximately true."Stanford has genuinely advanced the philosophical discussion about scientific realism with his careful articulation of the problem of unconceived alternatives."-- The Review of Metaphysics "Stanford's book deserves to be widely read. Its
central argument is clearly stated, its conclusion is radical, it engages in a productive fashion with detailed case studies, and it lays down several substantial challenges to scientific realism. Lastly, it is
consistently thought-provoking."-Science
1. Realism, Pessimism, and Underdetermination
1.1 Scientific Realism: What's at Stake?
1.2 Problems for Pessimism and Underdetermination
1.3 Recurrent, Transient Underdetermination, and a New Induction
over the History of Science
2. Chasing Duhem: The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives
2.1 Duhem's Worry: Eliminative Inferences and the Problem of
Unconceived Alternatives
2.2 Confirmation: Holism, Eliminative Induction, and
Bayesianism
2.3 Pessimism Revisited
3. Darwin and Pangenesis: The Search for the Material Basis of
Generation and Heredity
3.1 Preliminary Worries
3.2 Pangenesis: Darwin's "Mad Dream" and "Beloved Child"
3.3 Darwin's Failure to Grasp Galton's Common Cause Mechanism for
Inheritance
4. Galton and the Strip Theory
4.1 The Transfusion Experiments: "A Dreadful Disappointment to Them
Both"
4.2 Galton's Strip Theory and Its Maturational, Invariant
Conception of Inheritance
4.3 Galton's Understanding of "Correlation" and "Variable
Influences" in Development
5. August Weismann's Theory of the Germ-Plasm
5.1 German Biology at the End of the Nineteenth Century and
Weismann's Theory of the Germ-Plasm
5.2 Germinal Specificity, the Search for a Mechanism of Cellular
Differentiation and the Reservation of the Germ-Plasm
5.4 Productive and Expendable Germinal Resources
5.5 Conclusion: Lessons from History
6. History Revisited: Pyrrhic Victories for Scientific Realism
6.1 Realist Responses to the Historical Record
6.2 Once More into the Breach: The Pessimistic Induction
6.3 Reference without Descriptive Accuracy
6.4 Diluting Approximate Truth
7. Selective Confirmation and the Historical Record: "Another Such
Victory over the Romans"?
7.1 Realism, Selective Confirmation, and Retrospective Judgments of
Idleness
7.2 Theoretical Posits: They Work Hard for the Money
7.3 Trust and Betrayal
7.4 Structural Realism and Retention
7.5 Selective Confirmation: No Refuge for Realism
8. Science without Realism?
References
Index
Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of California, Irvine
"The argument is extremely clear, detailed, and thorough. It
doesn't try to be a textbook, and is aimed squarely at professional
philosophers and advanced students in philosophy of science."
--Metaphilosophy
"Stanford has genuinely advanced the philosophical discussion about
scientific realism with his careful articulation of the problem of
unconceived alternatives."-- The Review of Metaphysics
"Stanford's book deserves to be widely read. Its central argument
is clearly stated, its conclusion is radical, it engages in a
productive fashion with detailed case studies, and it lays down
several substantial challenges to scientific realism. Lastly, it is
consistently thought-provoking."--Science
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