the question of objectivity in legal interpretation has emerged in recent years as an imprtant topic in contemporary jurisprudence. This book addresses the issue of how and in what sense legal interpretation can be objective. The author supports the possibility of objectivity in law and spells out the content of objectivity involved. He then provides a defence against the classical, as well as less well-known, objections to the possibility of objectivity in
legal interpretation. The discussion is thoroughly grounded in metaphysics, which sets the book apart from other similar discussions in jurisprudence. Stavropoulos identifies an important
source of resistance to the acceptance of the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation; a widely held but faulty semantic. He then develops an alternative semantic framework, drawing on influential theories in contemporary philosophy. The book shows that objectivism is a natural, common sensical position, and rejects the currently popular notion that objectivism requires extravagant or bizarre metaphysics. Furthermore, the discussion presents the opportunity to re-interpret major
debates in jurisprudence and to show how influential theories, notably H.L.A. Hart's and Ronald Dworkin's, bear on that issue.
the question of objectivity in legal interpretation has emerged in recent years as an imprtant topic in contemporary jurisprudence. This book addresses the issue of how and in what sense legal interpretation can be objective. The author supports the possibility of objectivity in law and spells out the content of objectivity involved. He then provides a defence against the classical, as well as less well-known, objections to the possibility of objectivity in
legal interpretation. The discussion is thoroughly grounded in metaphysics, which sets the book apart from other similar discussions in jurisprudence. Stavropoulos identifies an important
source of resistance to the acceptance of the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation; a widely held but faulty semantic. He then develops an alternative semantic framework, drawing on influential theories in contemporary philosophy. The book shows that objectivism is a natural, common sensical position, and rejects the currently popular notion that objectivism requires extravagant or bizarre metaphysics. Furthermore, the discussion presents the opportunity to re-interpret major
debates in jurisprudence and to show how influential theories, notably H.L.A. Hart's and Ronald Dworkin's, bear on that issue.
`Applying, as it does, a sophisticated philosophical analysis to
questions of interpretation, objectivity, the relations between law
and morals, and to figuring out Ronald Dworkin's work, this book is
important reading for the serious scholar of analytical
jurisprudence, including the serious undergraduate.'
J. E. Penner, Modern Law Review
`This ingenious book ... makes too many challenging arguments in
favour of Dworkinian interpretivism even to list in a review ...
his complex and challenging book shows that jurisprudence is
essentially controversial.'
Timothy A. O. Endicott, Law Quarterly Review
`In order to follow the argument, a fair degree of acquaintance
with contemporary semantics, meta-ethics and jurisprudence is
required. That said, anyone who is interested in any of these
fields may find herself provoked and stimulated by this bold
attempt to rescue law from indeterminacy.'
Iain Law, Mind Vol.109, No.435. July 00.
`The arguments against ethical noncognitivism are elegant and
powerful'
R.E.S., Ethics, April 1999
|
Ask a Question About this Product More... |
|
